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Abstract5
Although supply chain risk management and supply chain reliability are topics that have been6
studied extensively, a gap exists for solutions that take a systems approach to quantitative risk7
mitigation decision making and especially in industries that present unique risks. In practice,8
supply chain risk mitigation decisions are made in silos and are reactionary. In this paper,9
we address these gaps by representing a supply chain as a system using a fault tree based10
on the bill of materials of the product being sourced. Viewing the supply chain as a system11
provides the basis to develop an approach that considers all suppliers within the supply chain as12
a portfolio of potential risks to be managed. Next, we propose a set of mathematical models to13
proactively and quantitatively identify and mitigate at-risk suppliers using enterprise available14
data with consideration for a firm’s budgetary constraints. Two approaches are investigated15
and demonstrated on actual problems experienced in industry. The examples presented focus16
on low volume high value (LVHV) supply chains that are characterized by long lead times and17
a limited number of capable suppliers, which make them especially susceptible to disruption18
events that may cause delays in delivered products and subsequently increase the financial risk19
exposure of the firm. Although LVHV supply chains are used to demonstrate the methodology,20
the approach is applicable to other types of supply chains as well. Results are presented as a21
Pareto frontier and demonstrate the practical application of the methodology.22
Keywords: Supply chain management, risk, optimization, fault tree23
1 Introduction24
In this paper, we propose a methodology to optimize the reliability of a supply chain using a fault tree25
based on the bill of materials of the product being sourced. In addiiton, the mathematical models26
developed return a propsed mitigation strategy for the supply chain system with consideration27
for a firm’s budgetary constraints. Although widely applicable, we focus the application of our28
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methodology to the nuclear power plant construction supply chain; an industry with supply chain29
challenges. The examples used are representative of real cases from the industry.30
Supply chain risk management (SCRM), which is already an extensively studied topic, recently31
became a popular area of interest because supply chains are experiencing greater exposure to risk.32
This greater risk is the result of recent changes in how businesses are being managed. Juttner et al33
(2003) identified the following business practices that have contributed to these increased risks: (1) a34
focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness, (2) supply chain globalization, (3) focused factories and35
centralized distribution, (4) a trend toward outsourcing, and (5) reduction of the supply base. Many36
industries have experienced an increase in supply chain risks due to these practices in combination37
with the characteristics of the industries they serve. For example, the nuclear industry is highly38
regulated, requires significant capital investment, has high regulatory barriers to entry, experiences39
infrequent and low quantity demands, and is primarily a make-to-design industry. This results in a40
scarcity of capable suppliers across supply chains, which leads to single and sole source situations,41
and makes carrying inventory buffers impractical.42
The following elements of this paper make a novel contribution to the study of supply chain43
risk management. First, we develop two supply chain risk mitigation models to identify at-risk44
suppliers and optimize the overall reliability of the supply chain. More specifically, we allocate45
resources among suppliers to maximize reliability of the supply chain. Next, we apply the approaches46
developed within this paper to demonstrate our approach and how it could be used to solve a47
practical problem facing a relevant industry.48
In the next section, a literature review of related work is presented followed by an overview of49
fault tree analysis and a summary of Sherwin et al. (2016) for those readers less familiar with the50
subject. Next, the model formulations are outlined. We then apply the models to solve a problem51
that faces supply chain professionals within the nuclear power industry. The paper concludes with52
a discussion of the results and recommendations for future work.53
2 Literature Review54
Since the early part of the 21st century there has been a significant increase in the number of55
published papers in the area of supply chain risk modeling (Fahimnia et al. , 2015). The SCRM56
2
literature (Snyder, 2006; Tang et al. , 2012) contains conceptual, quantitative, and qualitative57
methodologies applied to four primary elements of research: identification, assessment, mitigation,58
and responsiveness (Sodhi et al. , 2012). This section presents a review of current literature in those59
areas of research most relevant to this paper.60
Although research focusing on supply chain risk management and related areas has increased61
in recent years, a need remains for approaches that join both mature (e.g., tactical and operational62
planning, demand and supply forecasting) and emergent areas (e.g., sourcing and supply uncertainty63
modeling, sustainability risk analysis) (Qazi et al. , 2015; Fahimnia et al. , 2015). Traditional quan-64
titative operations research methodologies such as mixed integer programming (Snyder & Daskin,65
2005; Cui et al. , 2010; Lim et al. , 2010; Benyoucef et al. , 2013; Rafiei et al. , 2013), stochastic66
programming (Madadi et al. , 2014; Goh et al. , 2007; Bogataj et al. , 2015; Sawik, 2016; Tomlin,67
2006; Losada et al. , 2012), fuzzy optimization (Aqlan & Lam, 2015b,a; Chen et al. , 2006a; Lee,68
2009; Sohn & Choi, 2001), and simulation (Schmitt & Singh, 2009; Klimov & Merkuryev, 2008;69
Wilson, 2007) have been applied to solve supply chain disruption problems quantitatively.70
Some quantitative approaches estimate supplier risk through surveys of experienced personnel71
(Karsak & Dursun, 2015; Aqlan & Lam, 2015b) in lieu of empirical data. Surveys, rating systems,72
matrices, and the aggregation of data resulting from these types of methods fail to accurately73
measure the likelihood of risks and may lead to poor management decisions (Anthony Tony Cox,74
2008). Ivanov et al. (2015) note that it is almost impossible to determine the probability of endemic-75
type risks such as fires, natural disasters, or piracy. Simchi-Levi et al. (2014; 2015) develop a model76
to determine the impact of a disruption in the supply chain regardless of the cause or likelihood and77
use a risk-exposure model to assess the impact of disruptions originating in an automotive supply78
chain with a specific emphasis on low probability risks with high potential impact.79
Identifying risks that can occur in a supply chain and assessing the likelihood and consequences80
from those risks is important, but determining how best to mitigate those risks might be even more81
important for supply chains. Strategies for mitigating disruptions include site location selection82
(Akgün et al. , 2014; Snyder & Daskin, 2005), inventory stocking levels (Tomlin, 2006; Chopra et al.83
, 2007), and transportation decision models (MacKenzie et al. , 2012). Tomlin (2006) models a84
firm’s ability to mitigate supply chain risk using inventory or sourcing for multiple suppliers or a85
combination of the two. Other authors have investigated financial risk sharing within a supply chain86
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via contracts, pricing, or competition (Babich, 2006; Babich et al. , 2007; Babich, 2010). Kleindofer87
& Saad (2005) analyzes strategic decision making and focuses on risks arising from disruptions to88
normal activities and the management systems to cope with such supply chain risks. Other research89
in supply chain risk focuses on response strategies once a risk has been realized (Hishamuddin et al.90
, 2012; Xia et al. , 2004; MacKenzie et al. , 2014).91
Other approaches to mitigating supply chain risk concentrate on selecting less risky suppliers92
or working with existing suppliers to mitigate risk in those suppliers’ operations. Sawik (2011)93
proposes a portfolio approach to supplier selection with consideration for due dates, cost, and risk94
mitigation. The author develops a mixed integer program that seeks to minimize cost and considers95
when and from whom to purchase products based on price, quality, and supplier reliability. Chen96
et al. (2006b) propose the use of linguistic ratings expressed as fuzzy numbers to assess both97
qualitative and quantitative factors related to quality, price, flexibility, and delivery performance as98
a mechanism for supplier selection. Ghodsypour & O’Brien (1998) suggest a combined analytical99
hierarchy process and linear programming approach to consider both tangible (quantitative) and100
intangible (qualitative) factors for choosing the optimum supplier.101
The approach outlined in this paper can be used to select suppliers, but from the perspective102
of the effect that supplier selection has on the supply chain system’s reliability. Like Sherwin et al.103
(2016), we represent a supply chain as a fault tree, which provides a system view of the reliability of104
the supply chain being studied with consideration for the overall structure of the supply chain. We105
extend the authors’ work by developing a mixed integer program that seeks to maximize supply chain106
reliability where each supplier has a probability of failure. The firm mitigates risk in its supply chains107
by identifying suppliers that pose the greatest risk and then takes mitigation actions to increase the108
reliability of those suppliers. The solution methodology to identify the optimal mitigation activities109
converts the fault tree structure to a binary decision diagram in order to leverage the computational110
advantages (Sinnamon & Andrews, 1997, 1996; Remenyte-Prescott & Andrews, 2007). A holistic111
approach to proactively mitigate risks while considering multiple risk factors is another important112
contribution of our work and has been identified as a gap in the current research (Paul et al. , 2016;113
Snyder et al. , 2016).114
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3 Fault Tree Analysis and Binary Decision Diagrams115
The work outlined in this paper builds on the concept of representing a supply chain network as a116
fault tree (Sherwin et al. , 2016). In the paragraphs that immediately follow, additional background117
on fault tree terminology and a summary of the authors’ approach is outlined in order to assist118
readers who may be less familiar with fault tree analysis or binary decision diagrams.119
Fault tree analysis is one of the most important logic and probabilistic techniques used in120
probabilistic risk assessment and system reliability. It has been used extensively to uncover design121
and operational weaknesses in product design and process safety assessments. The value of the122
technique lies in its ability to not only identify low-probability and high-consequence events, but123
also high-consequence events that can result from the combination of events regardless of probability124
or severity. Since its inception in the mid-twentieth century, fault tree analysis has been used125
extensively by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as well as the nuclear126
industry (Veseley et al. , 2002).127
A variety of parameters are also used to describe fault trees quantitatively and will be used128
throughout this paper. Suppliers within a supply chain have a cause-and-effect relationship to one129
another, which is the same as events within fault trees describing other systems. One parameter,130
unreliability, is the probability that a failure to deliver on-time occurs during a specified time131
interval. Its inverse, reliability, is defined as the probability that a failure to deliver on-time does132
not occur. The time period used in this paper is defined as one calendar year.133
In fault tree analysis, an undesired state of the system being studied is identified as the top-level134
event. Next, the system is analyzed with respect to the potential ways in which the undesired event135
can occur. The fault tree is a graphic model constructed of the various parallel and sequential136
combinations of lower-level faults, or events, that lead to the undesired top event. (Veseley et al. ,137
2002)138
Sherwin et al. (2016) proposed the use of a fault tree to represent a supply chain network starting139
with a product’s bill of materials. The bill of materials consists of the assemblies, sub-components,140
raw materials, or services required to manufacture an item. The level of detail describing the bill141
of materials varies depending on the point of view of the practitioner within the supply chain. In142
addition, the authors proposed that suppliers providing the goods or services within a supply chain143
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can be represented as basic events. Therefore, the combination and structure of the suppliers within144
a given supply chain can be organized as a fault tree. The top event of the fault tree represents the145
overall delivery reliability of the the supply chain and thereby the final assembly that is comprised of146
the procured products and services. In the context of this paper, delivery reliability (or unreliability)147
is equivalent to a supplier’s on-time (or late) delivery performance metric for the product or service148
procured by the firm. As an example, let’s consider a product that a firm wishes to produce, Product149
#1. Its bill of materials consists of three subassemblies supplied by four suppliers, A, B, C, and150
D. The procurement for one of the subassemblies used in Product #1 will be divided between two151
suppliers, A and B. If either Supplier A or Supplier B deliver their respective products on time the152
supply chain is successful. Suppliers C and D are sole sources for the remaining two subassemblies.153
In the construction of the fault tree, higher level events are associated with lower level and154
parallel events through gates. OR-gates and AND-gates are two types of gates that are commonly155
used in fault trees and are used to represent single/sole source situations and multiple sources of156
supply respectively for the supply chain. Figure 1 illustrates the fault tree for Product #1’s supply157
chain.158
Figure 1: Supply chain represented as a fault tree.
159
The output of an OR-gate occurs if at least one of the input events occurs where the probability of160
failure (unreliability) can be calculated as 1−
∏
j∈J(1−uj). AND-gates are used to model events that161
must occur simultaneously in order for the output event to occur and correspond to a parallel system162
where the unreliability is calculated as the product of independent event probabilities,
∏
j∈J uj .163
(Lindhe et al. , 2009)164
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Next, we consider the unreliability of the individual suppliers, uj , which is an estimate of the165
probability that the supplier will not deliver their respective product or service on-time and j166
is defined as the combination of the supplier and product/service that the particular supplier is167
responsible for delivering. Throughout this paper, we have outlined cases where suppliers only168
provide one product or service, which is reasonable given the case studies. However, the models169
could easily accommodate suppliers that provide multiple products or services. In those cases, each170
product or service would be represented by a different index j for the given supplier. Table 1171
summarizes the unreliabilities for j = A, B, C, and D.172
Table 1: Unreliabilities of suppliers.
Supplier (j) Supplier unreliability (uj)
A 0.025
B 0.001
C 0.050
D 0.090
173
Within a fault tree, the combination of basic events that can cause the top event to occur is174
called a cut set. Multiple cut sets may occur within any given fault tree. A minimal cut set is the175
combination of basic events that result in the top event. In other words, minimal cut sets represent176
all the shortest ways that the basic events can cause the top event. The set of minimal cut sets177
can be obtained for any of the intermediate events (events common to the same gate) or overall for178
the top event in the fault tree. As the number of events and complexity increases within the fault179
tree, the use of algorithms becomes more important to efficiently identify the cut sets and minimal180
cut sets in particular. Examples of such algorithms have been based on binary decision diagrams181
and reliability block diagrams and include CARA, Shannon’s decomposition, and MOCUS among182
others. (Veseley et al. , 2002; Rosenberg, 1996)183
Using Figure 1 as an example, the top-level event can be expressed as a Boolean function and184
reduced to its primary input events by starting at the top of the fault tree and working downward.185
The • indicates an AND gate, + indicates an OR gate, and G designates the respective gate (G1,186
G2).187
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Top-Level =G1 +G2
= (C +D) +G2
= (C +D) + (A •B)
In the above example, three cut sets result - A •B, C, and D. Because of the simplicity of the188
example, each cut set is also a minimal cut set comprised of only basic events. Each of the minimal189
cut sets define an event or series of events whose existence will initiate the top-level event in the190
fault tree (Veseley et al. , 2002).191
To calculate cut set unreliability, the unreliabilities of events within the same minimal cut sets192
connected by AND gates are multiplied and those connected by OR gates are added. The result is193
the unreliability of each cut set (Ui). By applying the rare event approximation (uj < 0.1) (Veseley194
et al. , 2002) and given that the top event unreliability is the union of the minimal cut sets, we195
can sum the individual minimal cut set unreliabilities to obtain the unreliability of the top event in196
the fault tree, UREAS =
∑
Ui; where US is the unreliability of the system being studied and REA197
denotes that US was calculated using the rare event approximation. Since the probability of each198
cut set (UA•B = 0.0000125, UC = 0.05, and UD = 0.090) is less than 0.1, the probability of having199
two or more cut sets occur (e.g., C and D) is extremely small. Thus, according the rare event200
approximation, we can calculate the union of the probabilities as the sum of the probabilities. In201
the above example, UREAS = UA•B +UC +UD ≈ 0.1400. Likewise, the reliability of the supply chain202
for Product #1, RS , is equivalent to 1− US and is ≈ 0.8600.203
In the second integer program, which is referred to later as the imperfect mitigation model, we204
apply an alternative analysis procedure for fault trees based on the use of binary decision diagrams205
that identifies specific suppliers to mitigate. A binary decision diagram is constructed from the fault206
tree of interest and is a directed acyclic graph in which all paths through the binary decision diagram207
are in one direction and no loops can exist. The binary decision diagram consists of terminal and208
non-terminal nodes connected by branches. Terminal nodes correspond to the final state of the209
system (failure or success) and non-terminal nodes correspond to the basic events of the fault tree.210
(Andrews & Rementy, 2005)211
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Several methods have been proposed to convert fault trees to binary decision diagrams. Within212
this paper, we apply the component connection method (Andrews & Rementy, 2005). The process213
consists of three primary steps: 1) ordering, 2) construction/connection, and 3) simplification. For214
basic events that are connected through AND-gates, the corresponding nodes on the binary decision215
diagram are connected to each other through the 1-branch of the node. Alternatively, for basic events216
that are connected via OR-gates, the nodes that represent the basic events on the binary decision217
diagram are connected to each other on the 0-branch of the node. Figure 2 illustrates the conversion218
of the fault tree that represents the supply chain of Product #1 (Figure 1) into a binary decision219
diagram using the component connection method.220
Figure 2: Example of converting a fault tree to a binary decision diagram.
The resulting binary decision diagram consists of nodes that represent basic events and have221
associated probabilities of success (reliability) and probabilities of failure (unreliability) over a given222
time period. Reliability paths are connected via 0-branches and unreliability paths are connected223
via 1-branches. Paths that consist of the sequence of connections between basic events are cut sets224
from the original fault tree and terminate at either a terminal 1 node or a terminal 0 node. Paths225
that lead to a terminal 1 node specify the basic events (suppliers) for the top event in the fault226
tree to occur. In the example presented above, A → B → C is one of the terminal 1 paths and227
A → C → D is one of the terminal 0 paths. If redundancies within the binary decision diagram228
have been removed, the basic events (suppliers) contained within a path terminating in a terminal 1229
node lie along the fault tree’s minimal cut sets (Andrews & Dunnett, 2000). Conversely, the paths230
that terminate in a terminal 0 node indicate top event nonoccurence.231
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We define Pj,`(j,ω) as the probability of supplier j in path ω being in state `. The supplier232
is in state ` = 0 if the supplier is in a reliable state and in state ` = 1 if the supplier is in an233
unreliable state. The index `(j, ω) represents the state of supplier j in path ω. Hereafter, the234
notation Pj,`(j,ω) is simplified as Pj,ω since `(j, ω) is uniquely identified by j and ω. Let Ω be the235
set of all terminal 1 node paths. Using the binary decision diagram approach, for a given terminal236
1 path (ω) we can multiply the probabilities of all suppliers contained within that path (Jω) to237
obtain the unreliability of that path. Subsequently we can take the summation across all terminal238
1 paths to compute the top event (system) unreliability. For the example presented in Figure 2,239
the resulting top event unreliability can be computed as
∑
ω∈Ω
∏
j∈Jω Pj,ω where Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},240
J1 = {A,B}, J2 = {A,B,C}, J3 = {A,B,C,D}, J4 = {A,C}, J5 = {A,C,D}, and the probability241
of supplier j in path ω is a value that depends on one of two states, ` = {0, 1}. The computed242
unreliability using this method is ≈ 0.1355 or a reliability of ≈ 0.8645, which is slightly different243
than the reliability computed above. The difference in the unreliability between these two methods244
is a result of the first method employing the rare event approximation.245
4 Problem Description and Model Formulations246
4.1 Problem description247
The problem that we consider in this research is relevant and practical. A supply chain manager248
within the supply chain seeks to use resources as effectively as possible to mitigate risks with specific249
suppliers. Supplier risk can be mitigated by performing various actions (e.g., additional oversight250
is provided, the supplier is engaged in improvement activities, redundant suppliers are considered),251
each of which reduce the probability that the supplier is late and each of which costs resources. The252
manager seeks to minimize the unreliability (maximize the reliability) of the entire supply chain253
under their responsibility while staying within a prescribed mitigation budget.254
We approach the problem in two ways by formulating nonlinear integer programs that are255
subsequently reformulated into linear integer programs with the aim of improving computational256
efficiency. First, we develop a perfect mitigation model that aims at identifying areas of the supply257
chain that are at-risk. The next model described, which we refer to as the imperfect mitigation258
model, extends the perfect mitigation model by identifying specific mitigating actions to take on259
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specific suppliers to improve the overall reliability of the supply chain system.260
4.2 Model Formulations261
4.2.1 Perfect Mitigation Model262
For the purposes of this paper, perfect mitigation occurs when an activity is taken that sets the263
reliability of the cut set equal to 100%. In our formulation of the perfect mitigation model, we assume264
that events (and subsequently minimal cut sets) are independent. This is a practical assumption265
given that the factors that affect reliability within the supply chain studied have been shown not to266
have a high degree of correlation (Sherwin et al. , 2016). By assuming mutually independent events,267
we are able to apply Boolean algebraic operations and calculate the probability of occurrence that268
at least one mode of failure (i.e., minimal cut set) within the fault tree will occur (Vesely, 2002). As269
a result, the probability of failure of the top event of the fault tree can be stated as 1−
∏
i∈I(1−Ui)270
where (1 − Ui) is the probability that cut set i does not occur and I is the set of all minimal cut271
sets.272
The objective function (Eq. (1)) of a nonlinear integer program is formulated based on the above273
assumption and using the binary decision variable xi; where xi = 1 if minimal cut set i is mitigated274
and xi = 0 otherwise. Cut sets are linked to basic events (suppliers) via the model constraints275
and specifically a second binary variable yj ; where yj = 1 if supplier j is mitigated and yj = 0276
otherwise. J is defined as the set of all basic events (suppliers). Ji represents the set of suppliers277
that are members of cut set i. A budget value, b, is included in the formulation and represents the278
mitigation budget of the firm and is compared to the cost, cj , of mitigating supplier j. The basis279
for cj and its extension cjk are discussed in a later section. Given this notation, the objective for280
minimizing the supply chain reliability can be represented as follows:281
Minimize 1−
∏
i∈I
(1− Ui)1−xi (1)
By converting the minimization to a maximization and taking the logarithm of the objective282
function, the perfect mitigation model is reformulated as follows:283
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Maximize
∑
i∈I
log(1− Ui)(1− xi) (2)
s.t. xi ≤
∑
j∈Ji
yj ∀i ∈ I, (3)∑
j∈J
cjyj ≤ b (4)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I (5)
yj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ Ji (6)
Subsequently, the resulting supply chain reliability is computed by applying the exponential284
function to Objective Function (2):285
exp
[
Maximize
∑
i∈I
log(1− Ui)(1− xi)
]
(7)
Constraint (3) enforces that a minimal cut set can only be mitigated if at least one of its suppliers286
is mitigated and Constraint (4) enforces the budget for supplier mitigation. As mentioned above,287
this model assumes that if a supplier is mitigated then it is 100% reliable, an impractical assumption288
in many cases. In even the best circumstances, it is rare that a supplier will become perfectly reliable289
after completing mitigation actions. As a result, the perfect mitigation model computes a best-case290
bound and can serve as a means for practitioners to identify the areas or groups of suppliers of291
highest risk within the supply chain system.292
4.2.2 Imperfect Mitigation Model293
Whereas the perfect mitigation model describes perfect supplier intervention, we now introduce an294
imperfect mitigation model that selects individual suppliers to mitigate. In this example, supplier295
intervention reduces, but does not eliminate, the chance of supplier unreliability. Examples of such296
intervention activities that we will explore include taking action to improve the existing supplier’s297
reliability, replacing the supplier with an improved supplier, providing additional oversight to assist298
the supplier, or taking no mitigation action at all. All of the supplier-specific activities described299
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are intended to have a favorable impact on the overall reliability of the supply chain system and300
represent actual activities that are applied in industry settings.301
For the imperfect mitigation model we convert the fault tree that represents the supply chain302
system into a binary decision diagram. This approach leverages the computational advantages of303
the binary decision diagram structure as well as more effectively models the problem such that304
individual suppliers can be identified as targets for risk mitigation activities.305
The imperfect mitigation model is developed similarly to the perfect mitigation model, but is306
based on the binary decision diagram that has been converted from the fault tree that represents the307
supply chain structure being analyzed. The objective function is formulated as part of a nonlinear308
integer program and seeks to minimize the overall unreliability of the supply chain system. We309
introduce an index k to represent the mitigation activity performed on a supplier. More specifically,310
Pj,ω,k is the probability that supplier j along path ω does not deliver on-time if mitigation activity k311
was performed on supplier j. A binary decision variable yjk is introduced and represents whether or312
not supplier j is mitigated using action k. The selection of mitigation activity k reduces unreliability,313
but does not necessarily reduce the unreliability to 0%. Subsequently, taking the summation across314
all terminal 1 paths (ω ∈ Ω) within the binary decision diagram results in the top event unreliability,315
or system unreliability. Thus, the model is as follows.316
Minimize
∑
ω∈Ω
∏
j∈Jω
∏
k∈K
Pyjkj,ω,k (8)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
cjkyjk ≤ b (9)∑
k∈K
yjk = 1 ∀j ∈ J (10)
yjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J ; k ∈ K (11)
The objective function (8) represents the summation of the product of the unreliabilities of the317
path sets within the binary decision diagram. Constraint (9) is a budgetary constraint (b) and318
second constraint (10) assures that, if selected, a supplier (j) is only subject to one mitigation319
activity (k).320
In the imperfect mitigation model formulation, we extend the cost function values (cjk) used321
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in Constraint (9) specific to the mitigation activity chosen. By taking this approach, we are able322
to choose the optimal mitigation activities to take with individual suppliers that minimizes the323
unreliability of the supply chain system being studied within the budgetary constraints set by the324
firm.325
Next, we present a linearized reformulation of the imperfect mitigation model that exactly326
resolves the nonlinear terms at the expense of adding variables. Specifically, we introduce variables327
wωrk, which we will refer to as the partial probability associated with each path ω, r holds an index328
for the rth supplier on the path, and k is the mitigation activity applied to the rth supplier. These329
variables represent the quantity, Pj(1,ω),`(1,ω),k(1,ω)Pj(2,ω),`(2,ω),k(2,ω)...Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),k(r,ω), which is the330
probability that the first r suppliers within path ω realize the respective fail/no-fail state (`) assigned331
to them within the path given that k(r, ω) is the mitigation level for rth supplier j in path ω. Given332
that |Jω| is the index of the last supplier in path ω, wω|Jω |,k holds the product of all of the facility333
probabilities, which is equal to the probability of path ω. As a result, we can reformulate our model334
as follows.335
Minimize
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
k∈K
wω|Jω |,k (12)
s.t. wω1k = Pj(1,ω),`(1,ω),k(1,ω) yj(1,ω),k ∀k ∈ K; ω ∈ Ω; ` ∈ {0, 1} (13)∑
k∈K
wωr−1,k =
∑
k∈K
1
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),k(r,ω)
wωrk ∀ω ∈ Ω; ∀j ∈ J ; r = 2, ..., |Jω| ; ` ∈ {0, 1}(14)
0 ≤ wωrk ≤ yj(r,ω),k ∀j ∈ J ; k ∈ K; r ∈ R; ω ∈ Ω (15)∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
cjkyjk ≤ b (16)∑
k∈K
yjk = 1 ∀j ∈ J (17)
yjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J ; k ∈ K (18)
The objective function (12) is the summation of the probabilities of all scenarios that result in a336
failure, which is equivalent to the supply chain reliability. Constraints (13) are “probability chain”337
constraints that compute the realization probability of the first supplier (r = 1) in each path given338
the value of the mitigation decision variable, yj(1,ω),k . In these constraints variable wω1k corresponds339
to the first facility in path ω (note that this facility is in state `(r, ω) in path ω). The variable340
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wω1k equals the probability that this first facility is in state `(r, ω) when mitigation k is applied to341
this facility (i.e., Pj(1,ω),`(1,ω),k(1,ω)) if yj(1,ω),k = 1 and zero otherwise. For each path, the second342
constraint (14), also forming a probability chain, computes the (r− 1)th partial probability (wωr−1,k343
for some value of k) by taking the product of rth partial probability (wωrk for some value of k) and344
the inverse of the probability that the rth supplier is in state ` on the path (Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),k(r,ω) for345
some value of k); this “chain” starts with the second supplier in the path and continues to the last346
supplier. In this way, the partial probability of the last supplier in a path ω (wω|Jω |,k) is the product347
of the state probabilities of all of the suppliers in the path. The third constraints (15) assure that348
the partial probability variables wωrk are non-negative, but yet positive only if mitigation k is applied349
to the rth supplier in path ω (i.e., yj(r,ω),k = 1). The fourth constraint (16) serves as the budgetary350
constraint, and the fifth constraint (17) assures that only one mitigation activity (k) is selected for351
each supplier (j).352
The rationale for this linearized model is as follows. Let k∗(j) be the mitigation level selected353
for supplier j in the optimal solution (i.e., the value of k for which yjk = 1). Then the recursive354
Equations (19) (which correspond to (14) above) represent the partial probabilities of each path (ω)355
for r = 2, . . . , |Jω| .356
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),k∗(r,ω)wr−1,k∗(r−1) = wωrk∗(r) r = 2, ..., |Jω| ; ω ∈ Ω (19)
To show that Equation (14) results in Equation (19), consider the following example. Suppose357
that supplier r − 1 is mitigated by choosing k = 2 and supplier r by choosing mitigation activity358
k = 1. Expanding (14) we obtain:359
wωr−1,1 + w
ω
r−1,2 =
1
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),1
wωr1 +
1
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),2
wωr2 r = 2, ..., |Jω| ; ω ∈ Ω (20)
Because wωr−1,1 = 0 and wωr2 = 0,360
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wωr−1,2 =
1
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),1
wωr1 r = 2, ..., |Jω| ; ω ∈ Ω (21)
Rearranging Equation (21) yields the recursive equation in the format shown in Equation (19):361
Pj(r,ω),`(r,ω),1wr−1,2 = wωr1 r = 2, ..., |Jω| ; ω ∈ Ω (22)
5 Motivating Example: Nuclear Power Plant Supply Chain362
Firms, like those in the nuclear power industry, that produce a low volume of high value (LVHV)363
goods with long lead times are sensitive to supply chain disruptions since they do not have the luxury364
of inventory buffers to mitigate late deliveries due to higher cost items, lower production quantities,365
and less frequent deliveries. LVHV industries are studied less in supply chain risk management366
literature, but represent important industries in the U.S. economy, defense industry, and global367
economy overall. Examples of LVHV industries include aircraft, shipbuilding, and power plant368
construction, which are reported to have global market sizes of $1.96 trillion, $258 billion, and $4.78369
trillion respectively (Aboulafia, 2017; Geaney et al. , 2015; Dyble, 2018).370
Nuclear power plant construction supply chains are a good example of an LVHV industry, which371
are characterized by long lead times, demand for increasingly scarce capabilities, and fewer and372
fewer suppliers that are qualified to meet the stringent requirements. These characteristics create373
significant risk for firms within the nuclear power plant construction supply chain. The risks are374
confounded due to the low volume, costly barriers to entry, and relatively infrequent demand, which375
disincentivizes new firms from participating in the supply chain. Thus, LVHV firms like those in376
the nuclear industry are especially vulnerable to supply chain risks. These challenges that nuclear377
power plant construction supply chains face appear frequently in other LVHV supply chains such378
as the defense industrial base and aerospace.379
Although the models developed in this paper could apply to other supply chains, they are380
quite appropriate for LVHV supply chains primarily due to the aforementioned factors and the381
long lead times that these industries experience. The long lead times are a consequence of the382
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complexity and time that the projects take to design and manufacture. As a result, both suppliers383
and customers make long term commitments to one another and within their respective businesses384
to ensure they are qualified and capable to make such products. These characteristics, combined385
with the fact that these supply chains are comprised of several tiers, requires a significant level386
of coordination within the supply chain system to assure products are delivered on-time and with387
the requisite quality. For example, a British nuclear submarine can take 14 years to design and388
build at a cost of $1.6 billion (BBC, 2014). When suppliers fail to deliver equipment on-time,389
the completion of the end product can be significantly late and result in liquidated damages. In390
high volume supply chains, suppliers make deliveries more frequently, the deliveries are in higher391
quantities, buffer inventory levels are maintained, and the supply chain is typically comprised of a392
distributed network of suppliers. The typical risk management solutions for higher volume supply393
chains (inventory buffers, transportation networks, site selection, and constructing optimal response394
plans) may not be applicable to LVHV supply chains because of the unique risk exposure that results395
from a scarce supply of capable providers, low quantities of demand, significant capital investment,396
and long lead times to manufacture such goods. Therefore, LVHV supply chains require models397
that proactively identify and mitigate risks in order to improve reliability.398
In the sections that follow, the models presented above are applied at two levels within the399
same supply chain. The first level analyzes the basic supply chain used in nuclear power plant400
construction. The second level supply chain is based on the perspective of a supplier to the firm401
constructing the nuclear power plant and consists of a turbine, which is a key component used402
within the nuclear power plant. These examples demonstrate the flexibility of the approach in that403
it enables the decision maker to either take a broader system view of the supply chain or a modular404
view and include or exclude portions of the supply chain during their analysis.405
5.1 Supply chain definition406
We have chosen a pressurized water reactor as the basis for the bill of materials of the nuclear power407
plant because several nuclear power plants based on the pressurized water reactor design are being408
constructed worldwide (WNA, 2018). Further, our focus is on the primary items sourced for the409
plant. We exclude building materials and other items in order to simplify the application. The410
following items are included in the pressurized water reactor bill of materials used in our analysis411
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in the pages that follow: containment structure, pressurizer, steam generator, control rods, reactor412
vessel, steam turbine, generator, and condenser.413
One of the primary items in the pressurized water reactor is the steam turbine. Within the414
reactor vessel, the core creates heat. The heat is then transferred via the primary coolant loop to415
the steam generator where water is vaporized and produces steam. The steam is directed to the416
main turbine, causing it to turn the turbine generator, which results in electrical power production.417
(USNRC, 2015) Steam turbine designs vary. However, the primary components of a steam turbine418
include the casing, valves, a rotor containing blades, diaphragms, nozzles, and a host of other419
auxiliary equipment that comprise the turbine system. Examples of auxiliary equipment include420
thrust bearings, journal bearings, couplings, and lubricating systems. For the purposes of this study,421
we will examine a steam turbine thrust bearing. Figure 3 shows a schematic of a pressurized water422
reactor and its primary items. Figure 4 outlines the flow of the bills of material for the pressurized423
water reactor, steam turbine, and thrust bearing that will be used in the computational studies that424
follow.425
Figure 3: Schematic of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. (USNRC, 2016)
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Figure 4: Bills of material.
5.2 Fault tree and binary decision diagram formulation426
5.2.1 Pressurized water reactor427
For the pressurized water reactor supply chain, we take the perspective of the construction firm428
responsible for sourcing the primary goods and services for the pressurized water reactor. In the429
examples presented, we assume that multiple pressurized water reactors are being built simultane-430
ously. As a result, dual-sourcing positions across the multiple pressurized water reactor construction431
sites exist for some, but not all of the goods and services being procured by the construction firm.432
The pressurized water reactor supply chain consists of the eight primary goods and services provided433
by eleven suppliers. Table 2 outlines the suppliers (j), their respective goods and services, and the434
supplier’s unreliability (uj). The unreliability numbers, which are equivalent to the late delivery435
percentage, presented here are synthetic, but are reflective of unreliabilities experienced within the436
nuclear industry.437
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Table 2: Pressurized water reactor supply chain data.
Supplier (j) Good and/or Service Supplier unreliability (uj)
1 Containment structure 0.0031
2 Pressurizer 0.0236
3 Steam generator 0.0489
4 Control rods 0.0023
5 Control rods 0.0215
6 Reactor vessel 0.0441
7 Reactor vessel 0.0263
8 Turbine 0.0347
9 Generator 0.0088
10 Condenser 0.0288
11 Condenser 0.0411
The resulting fault tree for the pressurized water reactor can be found in Figure 5. Each of438
the goods and services provided are represented by basic events and the respective suppliers that439
provided them. Basic events that are inputs to the three AND gates in the fault tree include440
control rods, the reactor vessel, and the condenser. AND gates represent situations where the441
firm constructing the pressurized water reactor has chosen dual source options. The containment442
structure, pressurizer, steam generator, turbine, and generator are being provided by single sources443
of supply in this example and the basic events that represent them are connected via OR gates in444
the fault tree.445
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Figure 5: Pressurized water reactor fault tree.
A total of eight cut sets (i = 1, ..., 8) result from the pressurized water reactor fault tree. Each446
cut set is a minimal cut set, which represents an event or series of events whose occurrence will result447
in the realization of the top event of the fault tree (Veseley et al. , 2002). Using the data presented448
in Table 2 and the rare event approximation, the pressurized water reactor supply chain system449
unreliability is UREAPWR = 0.1215. Table 3 includes the minimal cut sets and associated minimal cut450
set unreliabilities for the pressurized water reactor fault tree.451
Table 3: Pressurized water reactor fault tree minimal cut set data.
Minimal Cut
Set (i)
Suppliers (j) Cut Set
Unreliability
(Ui)
1 1 0.0031
2 2 0.0236
3 3 0.0489
4 4 • 5 0.0000
5 6 • 7 0.0012
6 8 0.0347
7 9 0.0088
8 10 • 11 0.0012
UREASTTB = 0.1215
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Next, we construct a binary decision diagram using the component connection method. The452
binary decision diagram structure is used as input to the imperfect mitigation models as described453
above. Figure 6 is a graphical representation of the binary decision diagram based on the fault tree454
shown in Figure 5 where nodes represent suppliers.455
Figure 6: Binary decision diagram for pressurized water reactor fault tree.
5.2.2 Steam turbine thrust bearings456
Steam turbine thrust bearings are used as a primary component in the steam turbine (j = 8 in the457
pressurized water reactor fault tree). In constructing the fault tree for the thrust bearing, we take458
the perspective of the firm who is the supplier to the steam turbine manufacturer. In our example,459
the thrust bearing manufacturer’s supply chain consists of 44 suppliers (see Table 4 for individual460
supplier unreliabilities) and the resulting fault tree consists of 31 gates, which is shown in Figure 7.461
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Table 4: Steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain data.
Supplier (j) Good and/or Service Unreliability (uj) Supplier (j) Good and/or Service Unreliability (uj)
1 Plating 0.0195 23 Lab & Test 0.0199
2 Lab & Test 0.0424 24 Melt Stock 0.0178
3 Machining 0.0379 25 Lab & Test 0.0322
4 Machining 0.0419 26 Heat Treatment 0.0492
5 Casting 0.0203 27 Heat Treatment 0.0157
6 Forging 0.0450 28 Machining 0.0422
7 Lab & Test 0.0323 29 Casting 0.0065
8 Heat Treatment 0.0081 30 Casting 0.0062
9 Melt Stock 0.0092 31 Lab & Test 0.0276
10 Lab & Test 0.0433 32 Heat Treatment 0.0097
11 Plating 0.0459 33 Heat Treatment 0.0129
12 Lab & Test 0.0316 34 Melt Stock 0.0147
13 Machining 0.0009 35 Lab & Test 0.0190
14 Casting 0.0472 36 Machining 0.0343
15 Casting 0.0062 37 Machining 0.0328
16 Lab & Test 0.0454 38 Casting 0.0049
17 Heat Treatment 0.0332 39 Forging 0.0107
18 Melt Stock 0.0016 40 Forging 0.0010
19 Lab & Test 0.0475 41 Heat Treatment 0.0425
20 Forging 0.0362 42 Heat Treatment 0.0358
21 Machining 0.0189 43 Melt Stock 0.0484
22 Casting 0.0114 44 Lab & Test 0.0095
Figures 7 through 12 illustrate the supply chains as fault trees for the items used in the manufac-462
ture of the thrust bearing. These items include the thrust shoe, bracket, leveling links, and support463
ring. Thrust shoes are sourced from two separate suppliers. All other top-level items (bracket,464
leveling links, support ring) are procured from single or sole sources.465
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Figure 7: Steam turbine thrust bearing manufacturer top-level fault tree.
466
Figure 8: Thrust shoe supply chain (Source A).
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467
Figure 9: Thrust shoe supply chain (Source B).
468
Figure 10: Bracket supply chain (Source C).
469
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Figure 11: Leveling link supply chain (Source D).
470
Figure 12: Support ring supply chain (Source E).
471
A total of 99 minimal cut sets are contained within the thrust bearing fault tree. We again472
apply the rules of Boolean algebra and the rare event approximation. The resulting steam turbine473
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thrust bearing supply chain system unreliability is UREASTTB = 0.3128. This translates to a 31.28%474
probability of not being completed on-time as the result of delivery failures within the supply chain.475
Table 5 summarizes the unreliability data of the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain fault476
tree minimal cut sets.477
Figure 13 shows a portion of the overall binary decision diagram developed from the steam478
turbine thrust bearing fault tree and specifically the suppliers that comprise the thrust shoe supply479
chain (see Figure 8). After applying simplification rules (Andrews & Rementy, 2005), the steam480
turbine thrust bearing binary decision diagram consists of a total of 99 paths.481
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Table 5: Steam turbine thrust bearing fault tree minimal cut set data.
Minimal
Cut Set
(i)
Suppliers
(j)
Cut Set
Unreliability
(Ui)
Minimal
Cut Set
(i)
Suppliers
(j)
Cut Set
Unreliability
(Ui)
Minimal
Cut Set
(i)
Suppliers
(j)
Cut Set
Unreliability
(Ui)
1 1•11 0.00089505 34 9•20 0.00033304 67 7•18 0.00005168
2 1•12 0.00061620 35 9•16 0.00041768 68 7•19 0.00153425
3 1•13 0.00001755 36 9•17 0.00030544 69 7•14•15 0.00000945
4 1•18 0.00003120 37 10•11 0.00198747 70 7•20 0.00116926
5 1•19 0.00092625 38 10•12 0.00136828 71 7•16 0.00146642
6 1•14•15 0.00000571 39 10•13 0.00003897 72 7•17 0.00107236
7 1•20 0.00070590 40 10•18 0.00006928 73 8•11 0.00037179
8 1•16 0.00088530 41 10•19 0.00205675 74 8•12 0.00025596
9 1•17 0.00064740 42 10•14•15 0.00001267 75 8•13 0.00000729
10 2•11 0.00194616 43 10•20 0.00156746 76 8•18 0.00001296
11 2•12 0.00133984 44 10•16 0.00196582 77 8•19 0.00038475
12 2•13 0.00003816 45 10•17 0.00143756 78 8•14•15 0.00000237
13 2•18 0.00006784 46 5•11 0.00093177 79 8•20 0.00029322
14 2•19 0.00201400 47 5•12 0.00064148 80 8•16 0.00036774
15 2•14•15 0.00001241 48 5•13 0.00001827 81 8•17 0.00026892
16 2•20 0.00153488 49 5•18 0.00003248 82 21 0.01890000
17 2•16 0.00192496 50 5•19 0.00096425 83 24 0.01780000
18 2•17 0.00140768 51 5•14•15 0.00000594 84 25 0.03220000
19 3•4•11 0.00007289 52 5•20 0.00073486 85 22 0.01140000
20 3•4•12 0.00005018 53 5•16 0.00092162 86 23 0.01990000
21 3•4•13 0.00000143 54 5•17 0.00067396 87 26 • 27 0.00077244
22 3•4•18 0.00000254 55 6•11 0.00206550 88 28 0.04220000
23 3•4•19 0.00007543 56 6•12 0.00142200 89 31 0.02760000
24 3•4•14•15 0.00000046 57 6•13 0.00004050 90 32 0.00970000
25 3•4•20 0.00005749 58 6•18 0.00007200 91 29 • 30 0.00004030
26 3•4•16 0.00007210 59 6•19 0.00213750 92 33 0.01290000
27 3•4•17 0.00005272 60 6•14•15 0.00001317 93 34 • 35 0.00027930
28 9•11 0.00042228 61 6•20 0.00162900 94 36 • 37 0.00112504
29 9•12 0.00029072 62 6•16 0.00204300 95 43 0.04840000
30 9•13 0.00000828 63 6•17 0.00149400 96 44 0.00950000
31 9•18 0.00001472 64 7•11 0.00148257 97 38 0.00490000
32 9•19 0.00043700 65 7•12 0.00102068 98 39 • 40 0.00001070
33 9•14•15 0.00000269 66 7•13 0.00002907 99 41 • 42 0.00152150
UREASTTB = 0.31292916
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Figure 13: Binary decision diagram for steam turbine thrust bearing thrust shoe (see Figure 8).
483
5.3 Mitigation Cost484
The cost of mitigating the risks of supplier j is a function of the time estimated for the mitigation485
activity (k) and the hourly rate of personnel to complete the activity (h = $104 per hour (USBLS,486
2015)). The respective costs used for the four mitigation activities available are described in Table487
6 and were estimated empirically based on industry knowledge.488
Table 6: Cost function values.
Mitigation Activity k Reliability
Improve-
ment
cjk
Improve the existing supplier 1 15% $12,209
Replace supplier with an improved supplier 2 25% $27,737
Increase oversight at existing supplier 3 5% $10,816
No mitigation activity 4 0% $0
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In order to maintain consistency between the perfect mitigation model and the imperfect miti-489
gation model for comparison purposes, we have set the mitigation cost (cj) in the perfect mitigation490
model to $12,209, which is equivalent to cj1 in the imperfect mitigation model even though the491
functions described in Table 6 do not apply to the perfect mitigation model.492
6 Computational Results493
For the supply chains described above, we run the models outlined using data representative of the494
nuclear industry. Although the perfect mitigation model provides less information to the practi-495
tioner than the imperfect mitigation model, it can be notionally useful to identify areas of concern496
(suppliers to focus on when planning mitigation efforts) within the supply chain. Once those areas497
of concern are identified, the practitioner may choose the specific mitigation activities to perform498
for each individual supplier.499
The computational results are presented in a fashion relevant to the supply chain professional500
who, with a limited budget, will be challenged with minimizing risk across the supply chain system501
that he/she is managing. As a result, each model is run at $10,000 budgetary increments up to a502
maximum budget of $300,000 or an overall system reliability of 100% (0% unreliability), whichever503
comes first. Results are presented as a Pareto frontier and demonstrate the optimal tradeoff between504
the budget allocation and resulting reliability of the supply chain system being analyzed.505
Both the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains are analyzed506
in the pages that follow utilizing each of the modeling approaches outlined throughout this paper.507
6.1 Perfect Mitigation508
Here, we analyze the supply chains using the perfect mitigation model described in Objective Func-509
tion (2) and Constraints (4)-(6). Figure 14 demonstrates the tradeoff between the system relia-510
bility and mitigation cost for both the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing511
supply chains independently. Prior to investing in mitigation activities, the reliability of the pres-512
surized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains were RPMMPWR = 0.8837 and513
RPMMSTTB = 0.7285 respectively. At successive levels of investment, the reliability of each supply chain514
system increases as expected. The pressurized water reactor supply chain achieves 100% reliability515
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at a cost of $109,881. The steam turbine thrust bearing does not achieve 100% reliability prior to516
exhausting the $300,000 maximum budget. Instead, the thrust bearing supply chain sees a max-517
imum reliability of 99.98% at a total cost of $293,016. In both cases, the marginal improvement518
in system reliability decreases with increasing investment in mitigation activity. This information519
could prove quite important to a practitioner responsible for allocating resources to minimizing520
risk within a supply chain. For example, a supply chain manager might determine that budgeting521
$150,000 to increase the reliability of the thrust bearing supply chain is satisfactory given that the522
resulting improvement in reliability (to 95.12%) is sufficient.523
Figure 14: System reliability improvement as a function of mitigation budget (perfect mitigation
model).
Table 7 includes the minimal cut sets whose probabilities have been nullified and contain the524
suppliers selected to mitigate for each formulation and within the pressurized water reactor supply525
chain. Across all budgetary levels minimal cut set 4 was not chosen. This is reasonable given the526
fact that the cut set is already 100% reliable without any mitigation. Table 8 includes the same527
information in a summarized format for the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain. Minimal cut528
sets 6, 24, 33, 51, 78, 91, and 98 were not chosen by the model in the thrust bearing supply chain529
system. These cut sets have relatively lower reliability values and at the same time are located530
within regions of the fault tree/supply chain that have minimal impact on reducing the overall531
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system unreliability.532
Table 7: Minimal cut sets selected in pressurized water reactor supply chain.
Budget Minimal Cut Set(s)
$10,000 –
$20,000 3
$30,000 3, 6
$40,000 2, 3, 6
$50,000 1, 2, 3, 6
$60,000 1, 2, 3, 6
$70,000 2, 3, 6, 7
$80,000 1, 2, 3, 6, 7
$90,000 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8
$100,000 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7
$110,000 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8
Table 8: Minimal cut sets selected in steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain.
Budget Minimal Cut Set(s)
$100,000 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 92, 95
$200,000 1, 5, 7-10, 14, 16-19, 23, 25-28, 32, 34-37, 41,
43-46, 50, 52-55,
59, 61-64, 68, 70-73, 77, 79-86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95,
96
$300,000 1-5, 7-14, 16-23, 25-32, 34-41, 43-50, 52-59, 61-68,
70-77, 79-90,
92-97, 99
6.2 Imperfect Mitigation533
Objective Function (12) and Constraints (13)-(17) constitute the formulation of the linearized im-534
perfect mitigation model used to analyze the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust535
bearing supply chains. Prior to investment or taking any mitigating actions, the system reli-536
abilities of the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains were537
RIMMPWR = 0.8836 and RIMMSTTB = 0.7982 respectively. Figure 15 illustrates the tradeoff between in-538
creasing investments in mitigating activities and the improvement in supply chain reliability. At a539
total mitigation budget of $300,000 neither of the supply chains had achieved 100% system reliability540
(RIMMPWR = 0.9122, RIMMSTTB = 0.8354).541
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Figure 15: System reliability improvement as a function of mitigation cost (imperfect mitigation
model).
Table 9 illustrates the suppliers and mitigation activities selected at three budgetary levels for542
the pressurized water reactor supply chain. Optimal mitigation activities at select budgetary levels543
for the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain are shown in Table 10. For both supply chains,544
the mitigation action increase oversight at existing supplier (k = 3) was only chosen twice, at545
b = $150, 000 and b = $230, 000, which was the least frequent of all mitigation options. Next to546
selecting no mitigation activity (k = 4), increasing oversight at the existing supplier projected the547
least impact on improving reliability (5%) at a relatively similar cost ($10,816) to improving the548
existing supplier (k = 1), which cost $12, 209 and resulted in a reliability improvement of 15%.549
Table 9: Suppliers selected in the pressurized water reactor supply chain.
Budget
Supplier(s)
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
$100,000 9 2, 3, 8 – 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10,
11
$200,000 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 – 4
$300,000 4 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11
– –
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Table 10: Suppliers selected in the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain.
Budget
Supplier(s)
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
$100,000 31 25, 28, 43 – 1-24, 26, 27, 29,
30, 32-42, 44
$200,000 11, 16, 19, 21,
24
23, 25, 28, 31,
43
– 1-10, 12-15, 17,
18, 20, 22, 26,
27, 29, 30,
32-42, 44
$300,000 11, 16, 17, 19,
20, 22, 32, 33
21, 23, 24, 25,
28, 31, 43
– 1-10, 12-15, 18,
26, 27, 29, 30,
34-42, 44
Similar to the perfect mitigation model, the tradeoff between mitigation investment and improve-550
ment in overall supply chain system reliability is useful to a practitioner. Compared to the perfect551
mitigation model, the imperfect mitigation model provides additional flexibility since mitigation552
activities for individual suppliers are chosen by the model. As a result, improvements in system re-553
liability based on specific actions are observed up to the maximum budget allocated ($300,000) and554
the practitioner is left to decide if the incremental investment is worth the additional improvement.555
The additional flexibility that the imperfect mitigation model provides a supply chain practi-556
tioner is evident in the activities chosen by the model. Generally, if mitigation funds are available,557
the model seeks to maximize the use of those funds for a corresponding maximum benefit in system558
reliability. As a result, the mitigation activities chosen and the suppliers chosen to mitigate change559
at increasing budgetary levels depending on the cost-reliability tradeoff; a pattern that is observed560
in both the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine generator supply chains.561
6.3 Comparison of Mitigation Models and Formulations562
Next, we compare the two mitigation models by analyzing the solution sets at the same budgetary563
levels and the system reliabilities at the same budgetary levels for each of the supply chain systems564
studied. The perfect mitigation model contains two decision variables, xi and yj , which represent the565
cut sets containing suppliers and the suppliers chosen at each mitigation budget level respectively.566
As a result, we are able to compare the solution sets of suppliers selected for the perfect and imperfect567
mitigation models for each budgetary level. Tables 11 and 12 include a summary of the results of568
the solution sets for both supply chains studied at select budgetary levels. Overall, the models569
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agree relatively well with respect to the suppliers selected for mitigation within the same budgetary570
level. It’s worth noting that the perfect mitigation model for the pressurized water reactor supply571
chain reached 100% reliability at a budgetary level of $100,000. Therefore, comparisons of the two572
models at budgetary levels greater than $100,000 are not valid. Across both supply chains, certain573
suppliers appear to be preferred by one or both of the mitigation models. For example, Supplier574
3 is selected by both the perfect and imperfect mitigation models consistently in the pressurized575
water reactor supply chain up to a budgetary level of $110,000. Similarly, Supplier 28 is selected576
by both mitigation models in the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain up to a budgetary577
level of $300,000. In both supply chains, Supplier 3 and Supplier 28 represent suppliers with lower578
reliabilities in comparison to other suppliers. From these general trends, it appears that there is a579
preference to select suppliers for mitigation that will have the largest contribution to maximizing580
the reliability of the respective supply chain system.581
Table 11: Comparison of suppliers selected in the pressurized water reactor supply chain.
Budget
Supplier(s)
Not Selected Only PMM Only IMM Both PMM and
IMM
$10,000 1-11 – – –
$50,000 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 1, 2 – 3, 8
$100,000 4, 5, 11 1, 6, 7, 10 – 2, 3, 8, 9
Table 12: Comparison of suppliers selected in the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain.
Budget
Supplier(s)
Not Selected Only PMM Only IMM Both PMM and
IMM
$100,000 1-20, 22, 26, 27, 29,
30, 32, 34-42, 44
21, 23, 24, 33 – 25, 28, 31, 43
$200,000 1-10, 12-15, 18, 26,
27, 29, 30, 35-42
17, 20, 22, 32, 33,
44
– 11, 16, 19, 21, 23,
24, 25, 28, 31, 43
$300,000 1-10, 14, 15, 27, 29,
30, 35, 37, 39, 40,
41
12, 13, 18, 26, 34,
36, 38, 42, 44
– 11, 16, 17, 19-25,
28, 31, 32, 33, 43
To compare the system reliabilities for each budgetary level, we introduce a metric, δ, that we582
define as |R
PMM
S −R
IMM
S |
RPMMS
where RPMMS is the system reliability for the perfect mitigation model583
and RIMMS is the system reliability for the imperfect mitigation model at each budget level for the584
respective supply chain being analyzed. A summary of results is presented in Figure 16. In general,585
35
δ increases for each supply chain with increasing budget levels with the exception of δSTTB, which586
decreases from 9.6% at a mitigation budget of $10,000 to 0.8% at $30,000 and then increases at587
successive budget levels with a few exceptions. Overall, δPWR increases with increasing mitigation588
budgets with a few exceptions. Thus, across the range of mitigation budgets inspected, the two589
mitigation models diverge from one another with increasing budget and appear to converge to a590
relatively constant value of δPWR ≈ 9.0% and δSTTB ≈ 16.5% for each of the respective supply591
chains. These results are important for the practitioner to understand if they should choose to use592
the perfect mitigation model in lieu of the more detailed imperfect mitigation model. In addition,593
the practitioner should be aware of how the difference between the two models stabilizes only at594
higher budgetary levels.595
Figure 16: Comparison of perfect and imperfect mitigation model system reliabilities.
In general, the solution times observed for all models, formulations, and supply chains were as596
expected in that the solution times corresponded to the complexity of the supply chain. Overall, the597
steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain, which consists of 44 suppliers took longer to solve than598
the pressurized water reactor supply chain, which has 11 suppliers. The perfect mitigation model599
solved more quickly than the imperfect mitigation model. The majority of the models contained600
within the computational study converged on the optimal solution within a maximum of a few601
minutes with few exceptions. Table 13 shows the solution times as a function of the budgetary602
36
levels at which the respective models were run and provides summary statistics for each model,603
formulation, and supply chain combination. All models were run on the NEOS Server (Czyzyk et al.604
, 1998; Dolan, 2001; Gropp & Moré, 1997) using CPLEX (v. 12.7.0.0) for the linear formulations.605
When applied to larger supply chain systems, faster computation time may be beneficial to the606
supply chain professional. As a result, depending on the objective of the analysis, the perfect607
mitigation model may be most advantageous. However, if the more detailed results produced by608
the imperfect mitigation model are desired, the additional computation time comes at a relatively609
low penalty in comparison to the perfect mitigation model.610
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Table 13: Summary of solution times (seconds).
Perfect Mitigation Model Imperfect Mitigation Model
Mitigation Budget PWR STTB PWR STTB
$10,000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
$20,000 0.002 0.012 0.02 0.97
$30,000 0.007 0.010 0.05 5.40
$40,000 0.008 0.010 0.05 7.11
$50,000 0.010 0.016 0.14 15.14
$60,000 0.010 0.009 0.09 27.57
$70,000 0.006 0.010 0.08 35.07
$80,000 0.006 0.009 0.06 48.31
$90,000 0.006 0.010 0.11 61.18
$100,000 0.003 0.010 0.11 69.92
$110,000 0.002 0.010 0.12 58.99
$120,000 - 0.010 0.11 127.59
$130,000 - 0.007 0.12 91.09
$140,000 - 0.007 0.11 90.47
$150,000 - 0.011 0.15 73.12
$160,000 - 0.007 0.16 111.96
$170,000 - 0.009 0.39 122.44
$180,000 - 0.009 0.18 156.72
$190,000 - 0.007 0.18 126.77
$200,000 - 0.020 0.19 94.15
$210,000 - 0.007 0.18 133.09
$220,000 - 0.007 0.16 187.96
$230,000 - 0.007 0.14 112.24
$240,000 - 0.007 0.14 151.75
$250,000 - 0.009 0.10 312.28
$260,000 - 0.007 0.09 184.43
$270,000 - 0.008 0.13 147.36
$280,000 - 0.007 0.07 173.06
$290,000 - 0.008 0.08 255.75
$300,000 - 0.007 0.08 164.79
Average 0.01 0.01 0.12 104.89
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.07 74.44
Maximum 0.01 0.02 0.39 312.28
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 Conclusions and Managerial Insights611
The approach outlined in this paper solves many of the supply chain risk mitigation decisions that612
face practitioners in a variety of industries. Because our approach links the bill of materials being613
sourced by modeling the supply chain system as a fault tree, the practitioner is enabled with a614
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quantitative decision tool that takes into account the impact that an individual mitigation decision615
can have on the overall reliability of the supply chain being analyzed. In addition, the data used616
within the models presented is available to most managers, which makes the approach practical to617
implement.618
All too often, reactionary decision making is common in supply chain management and resources619
are consumed in the associated activities. The methods described in this paper enable the supply620
chain practitioner to conduct scenario analysis to determine which supply chain structures pose the621
greatest risk and highest costs to manage. Examples of scenarios that can be analyzed include, but622
are not limited to supplier selection, the use of single or sole sources of supply, and the impact of623
redundant sources of supply. In addition, the supply chain models can be updated to reflect the624
actual performance of suppliers. As a result, the supply chain professional may choose to reallocate625
resources to individual suppliers in order to further mitigate risk within the supply chain for orders626
that have not yet been fulfilled.627
As noted, many decisions are based on experience, which is valuable, but can be flawed. The628
data required in the models described is collected by most firms and is readily available via their629
respective enterprise resource planning systems. As a result, practitioners can utilize available data630
to make more quantitatively informed decisions, which can be supplemented by experience. For631
example, if run at various budgetary levels the imperfect mitigation model will return a set of632
supply chain system reliabilities. The practitioner can then use their experience and knowledge of633
the respective organization to make a tradeoff between the mitigation costs and improved reliability634
provided by the Pareto set.635
We compared both the results and run times of the imperfect and perfect mitigation models636
presented. As expected, the linearized formulations of both models demonstrated quicker solution637
times than their nonlinear counterparts. Further, the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain638
had slower solution times as expected due to it having more suppliers (44) than the pressurized639
water reactor supply chain (11).640
Even though the model is more complex, the imperfect mitigation model is more practical to641
implement as it provides specific mitigation activities for the user to consider. Despite the fact642
that only four mitigation options were presented in this paper, additional mitigation options can be643
added with relative ease to the imperfect mitigation model and customized to the individual needs644
39
of the firm.645
The research presented herein advanced the use of fault tree analysis to represent a supply chain646
based on the bill of materials of a product or service procured. (Sherwin et al. , 2016) Our approach647
provides a system-based methodology to risk mitigation that minimizes supply chain unreliability648
while simultaneously achieving the budgetary constraints of the firm. Furthermore, the technique649
is applicable to all levels of the supply chain and viewpoints from within the supply chain. We650
demonstrated this by taking the perspective of a firm constructing a nuclear power plant as well as651
a lower-tier firm within the supply chain that manufactures a thrust bearing that will be supplied652
within a critical assembly installed in the power plant.653
Several areas of future work are planned. First, our modeling approach only accounts for the654
reliability of the suppliers within the supply chain and addresses neither the severity nor the impact655
of a delay that may result from a supplier having less than 100% reliability. Extending the models656
to account for the impact that a risk may have if realized as well as the associated downtime is657
useful.658
In addition, our approach assumes that supplier data is known and available at the time the659
model is built. In practice, this is not always the case and is most notable for new suppliers660
that the firm has no prior history with. We plan to use machine learning methods to model the661
reliability of a supplier. In order to do so, it is important to understand the explanatory variables662
that correspond to supplier reliability. By developing predictive models, we will be able to relax663
the independence assumption utilized in this paper and begin to integrate risks shared by suppliers664
within a supply chain. Examples of such risk factors include natural disasters such as hurricanes,665
which are geographically and seasonally dependent.666
Furthermore, the models presented only permit the selection of a single mitigation activity for667
each supplier. Extending the concept to allow more than one mitigation activity and combination668
thereof should be considered in future work.669
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